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Abstract – The reflood map, developed in the last decade, was designed as a tool to focus on 
preventive and mitigative measures to prevent severe core damage scenarios and to identify 
research areas. In the meanwhile, additional experiments were performed and their data are 
available, so that an update seems necessary. For homogeneous particulate debris configurations, 
several experimental programs shed light on coolability. For the transition from in-core early 
phase to in-core late phase i.e. the loss of the rod like geometry, experimental database is still 
rather scarce due to the difficulty to describe the state of the core components and the fluid 
adequately. According to the new insight, an update of the database and the reflood map is 
discussed, also with respect to assess available grace times.
I. INTRODUCTION
Main aims of accident management during a severe 
accident in a light water reactor is to reflood the core, 
perhaps with external flooding capabilities, and so to 
achieve long-term coolability. A basic question is under 
which conditions these aims can be achieved. 
An operator in the control room has only limited 
insight into the core status during an accident: After the 
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only the sensors for the core exit temperature in the upper 
plenum may be in function. A support for decisions must 
therefore rely on another basis.  
To find the conditions and limits of coolability, an 
ongoing activity since 2005 is focused on an overall 
analysis of the database on degraded core reflood, mostly 
experiments, available in open literature. For this aim, it is 
considered helpful to establish a relationship between core 
exit temperature and core damage state. It should, however, 
be kept in mind that the experimental boundary conditions 
differ significantly from those of a reactor due to inherent 
limitations in experiments. In addition, some uncertainties 
remain with are based on experimental limitations and 
peculiarities, intangible experimental domains and scaling 
barrier. E.g., the successful accident termination in TMI-2 
cannot be extrapolated directly to large power plants. 
Several papers have been published on establishing 
and updating of the core reflood map1,2, focused on the 
early core melt phase. Due to the ongoing research, the 
reflood map is considered as a living document. Since the 
first presentations2,3, further experiments have been 
performed so that an update is presented in this report. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL DATABASE
The profound investigation of TMI-2, out-of-pile 
experiments in various test facilities, and some in-pile tests 
form the present database, listed in the first column of 
Table I. Except for TMI-2, which is only rather a small 
nuclear power plant, the scaling between experiments and 
existing reactors spans 50–9000 in volume and power and 
1–20 in length. The Hungarian CODEX (X) tests5 are per-
formed in 3x3 bundles. The rather new Russian PARA-
METER6,7 (P) tests in Lutch, Podolsk, dedicated to top and 
bottom flooding, refer to 19 rods in VVER bundles. The 
FZK reflood experiments CORA (C) and QUENCH (Q) 
address bundle sizes between 18 and 48 (CORA) 21 and 31 
(QUENCH) rods. The central fuel element in LOFT-LP-
FP2 (L), amounts to 121 rods8, and the TMI-2 (T) core had 
about 37000 rods. The characters in parenthesis are used as 




and seven VVER (V) reflood experiments, two CODEX, 
one QUENCH, and four PARAMETER tests. System 
pressure is classified to be low (L), i.e. below 0.5 MPa, or 
high (H). Information about the various tests is available in 
the respective institutions and data bases like that of the 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). 
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TABLE I 
Overview on experiments about degraded core reflood 
2
For completeness, a PHEBUS SFD in-pile experiment 
(PHEBUS SFD B9R2, ISP-28) with forced convection 
cool-down is added9. The licensing for the PHEBUS 
experimental facility did not allow using liquid water due 
to neutronics feedback with the driver core – so the tests 
were terminated by shut-down of the driver core and 
cooling down with helium. For the same sake of complete-
ness, the Cleaning Tank Incident (CTI) at Paks NPP10 is 
added. 
Local blockages prior to reflood initiation were 
detected only in CORA-13 by video inspections11	 	
QUENCH-03 and QUENCH-09, some thermocouple 
readings may be interpreted as affected by a local 
blockage. Similarly, the only candidate for reflooding of 
extended local debris is the in-pile test LOFT LP-FP2, due 
to the high peak cladding temperature (PCT) of ~ 2310 K 
prior to reflood initiation. Due to the lack of information, 
reflood with large debris and/or molten pools is discussed 
elsewhere12.  
The OECD International Standard Problem No. 45, 
ISP-45, on QUENCH-06 showed that in thermal hydraulics 
system codes13, coupled with core degradation modules, 
and integral codes reflood of a slightly damaged core is 
principally understood. In the meanwhile, the ongoing 
code development has improved description of the fuel rod 
and absorber rod behavior, and of reflood. 
Rather a new topic is air ingress. It may happen in 
maintenance states, spent fuel pool accidents, or in the in-
vessel late phase after RPV failure. Presently, the database 
for air-ingress prior to reflood is relatively scarce. In 
CODEX-AIT5, QUENCH-1014, QUENCH-1615, and 
PARAMETER-SF47, the bundle was exposed to a mixture 
of oxygen and nitrogen and cooled down by steam in 
CODEX-AIT or quenched with water in the other tests. 
In the top flooding experiment PARAMETER-SF1, 
the temperatures in the upper part of the heated part of the 
bundle (0.6–1.0 m) exceeded 2300 K during reflood 
similarly to bottom flooding, while the other parts of the 
bundle were quenched quickly. At a first glance, the 
reflood occurred similarly to respective tests in the Upper 
Plenum Test Facility16,17 (UPTF) facility at Grafenrhein-
feld, Germany. 
In Table I, the final core damage state (CDS) of the 
various SFD reflood experiments is given next to 
information about the reactor type and pressure level, 
classified in seven stages. Additional information about 
absorber rod materials (SIC and B4C) is added as well as 
information on localized effects found during destructive 
post-test analysis. “B” stands for ballooning, “tiny” means 
tiny molten pools between adjacent fuel rods, and “partial” 
indicates a heterogeneous final state. Furthermore, the 
spatial extension of a CDS is sketched by light and bright 
colors. 
For LOFT and TMI-2, the CDS can be estimated to 3 
or 4 (debris without pool formation). A more precise 
classification is difficult due to the different histories 
before quench initiation. In QUENCH tests, the bundle 
degradation prior to reflood initiation can mostly be 
classified to CDS 1 to 3. The debris test QUENCH-
1718,24,25 is difficult to interpret in this context, since the 
temperatures were below 1800 °C, no temperature increase 
was measured during reflooding, and no additional damage 
was observed. However, it turned out that due to the long 
pre-oxidation time with steam and air, the remaining 
oxidation potential is rather low so that only decay heat 
driven temperature increase can transform the debris to a 
molten pool. In case of a faster heat-up rate, the 
temperature would exceed 1800 °C, leading to clad and 
fuel damage. The QUENCH-Debris test has not reached 
CDS 6, since the outer ring of fuel rods (with tungsten 
heaters) and the four corner rods remained intact. This 
means that about 76 % of the bundle cross section inside 
the shroud is filled by debris. 
Information about CDS 5 and subsequent ones is 
scarce, because related integral experimental investigations 
are expensive and very difficult to perform, especially 
because sophisticated on-line instrumentation is required to 
detect bundle status prior to reflood. In addition, the loss of 
bundle geometry cannot be simulated correctly by 
electrically heated rods. Moreover, the lateral damage 
progression cannot be represented correctly so that 
dedicated small-scale two-dimensional-model experiments 
have to be performed for code qualification19. 
All CORA, QUENCH, and PARAMETER tests were 
terminated before reaching CDS 6, which, in contrast, is 
achieved in all PHEBUS FPT tests. Due to the forced 
convection, a flow path is established between debris/mol-
ten pool and the colder shroud allowing sufficient steam to 
pass. For the small bundle size, this channel is sufficient to 
quench this configuration. A successful review requires a 
detailed knowledge of the test facility and detailed analysis 
of the test sequence to identify time and locations of the 
deviation from prototypical behavior based on destructive 
post-test examinations19. 
In the next section of Table I, the peak cladding 
temperature (PCT) is given prior to and after reflood 
initiation indicating the additional energy release due to 
Zry oxidation, which intensifies the core degradation and 
hinders fast quenching. Heat-up rate and information about 
steam supply are added, because these factors determine 
the oxide layer thickness as well as the reflood medium 
steam or water is added. The reflood mass flow rate is 
given as an injection mass flow rate per rod (RMFR), the 
shroud and other relevant structure elements being taken 
into account as additional rod surfaces. RMFR is related to 
the interaction between fluid and rods such as oxidation 
and melt relocation. 
Hydrogen production before reflood initiation, 
contributions from non-prototypical reactions (formation 
of molybdenum and tungsten oxides in QUENCH tests20) 
and measured total hydrogen mass are given explicitly in 
Table I. The latter might be overestimated in QUENCH 
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tests21 and needs some further clarification. The contribu-
tions from non-prototypical reactions are subtracted from 
measured hydrogen production after reflood initiation and 
labelled “Corrected H2 mass during quench”. The ratios of 
corrected and measured hydrogen production during 
quench to the respective hydrogen production during the 
whole test are added for comparison. The last column 
shows the fraction of consumed Zry, normalized to bundle 
sections at temperatures above 1500 K, corresponding to a 
bundle segment from about 0.6 to about 1.2 m elevation. 
For two experiments, QUENCH-07 and QUENCH-09, 
these values are close to or even exceed 100 % for 
unknown reasons. 
III. NEW EXPERIMENTS
Two QUENCH experiments are of large interest for 
the reflood database. QUENCH-11 was dedicated to 
investigate the reflood behavior under low mass flow rates 
and QUENCH-17 dealt with reflood of a fuel rod bundle 
with particulate debris. A follow up experiment on debris-
quenching is planned in the near future. 
III.A. QUENCH-11
Test QUENCH-1122 covers the whole accident 
scenario: It consists of a LOCA pre-test which leads to a 
certain pre-oxidation, which was followed by the 
simulation of boil-down, dry-out, core heat-up, and early 
degradation phases until the damaged bundle was flooded 
slowly. An RMFR of 0.6 g/s*rod was chosen to be below 
the critical value of ~ 1 g/s*rod, deduced from PBF SFD-
ST and LOFT LP-FP 2 analyses23. This low value was 
selected to account for the shroud in the QUENCH facility, 
which only contributes by oxidation. 
In a first step (Q11v3), this test sequence was 
performed for normal design basis conditions, hence at 
temperatures below 1500 K, giving a complete set of 
experimental data. In the main test, the water in the filled 
test section was evaporated by means of bundle power and 
an auxiliary heater in the lower plenum, which was 
necessary to provide a sufficient evaporation rate in case of 
low water level. The auxiliary heater simulates the decay 
heat released in the lower sections in the core and produces 
steam for cooling and oxidation in the upper part. The boil-
down phase was extended by injecting additional water to 
simulate the water in the downcomer of an LWR. Finally, 
to protect the lower electrode zones, the water level was 
stabilized below the heated zone. Due to its relevance for 
possible AMM (Accident Management Measures) 
situations, QUENCH-11 was chosen as a SARNET code 
benchmark. The benchmark31 indicated the need for further 
experimental and analytical work to get reliable predictions 
under such extreme situations. However, it becomes clear 
that degraded core reflood under such conditions should 
not be considered for AMM. 
III.B. QUENCH-17
The bundle degradation and deformation were 
investigated during the experiment QUENCH-17 on debris 
formation18,24,25. Its primary aims were to examine the 
formation of a debris bed inside the completely oxidised 
region of the bundle without melt formation and to 
investigate the coolability phenomena during the reflood of 
the damaged bundle with debris particles of fuel simulators 
without active volumetric heat sources. 
Post-test examination showed the formation of a 
debris bed between elevations 400 and 750 mm, which was 
indicated by the stagnation of water front propagation and 
oscillations of evaporation rate in this region. The debris 
bed above 750 mm was formed mostly by the post-test dis-
mounting of the bundle head. The debris particles are 
randomly distributed without formation of dense packing. 
Partial blockages (maximum 85 % at 400 mm) by relo-
cated pellet segments and oxide scales spalled from 
Zircaloy claddings as well as large empty volumes between 
bended rods were detected. 
Most of the Zry-4 claddings experienced relatively 
limited damage, and there was generally only minor 
damage of the geometrical integrity of the nine inner rods. 
Ceramic debris collected at the top of spacers consists of 
separate pellet segments and relatively large oxidized 
cladding segments. The porosity of the debris bed is signi-
ficant, no dense packing of debris particles was observed. 
Large empty volumes formed due to bending of rods. The 
maximum bundle blockage is about 85 %. This blockage 
does not affect noticeably coolability of the bundle until 
the end of the test. However, this effect is a consequence of 
an unavoidable difference of such laboratory experiments 
and nuclear reactors. In the experiment, the mass flow rate 
is prescribed and as far as there is a remaining flow 
passage, the entire mass flow passes through the bundle. In 
a reactor, however, a large number of parallel channels 
(subassemblies) exist. If one of them or even a number of 
them is blocked seriously, the flow bypasses the blocked 
subassemblies easily. 
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE DATABASE
The instrumentation of integral experiments delivers a 
huge amount of data, which have to be assessed and 
compared with each other for consistency before any 
interpretation. The consistency check has to consider the 
individual sensitivity as well as the uncertainties caused by 
position, type, and characteristics of the sensors. Therefore, 
especially for integral data such as hydrogen mass or 
amount of core degradation, separation between facility 
based and reactor specific or prototypic effects is necessary 
to qualify the measured values. 
Such detailed knowledge is only available for the 
QUENCH tests. In these tests, it was seen in post-test 
examination that oxidation of tungsten heaters and 
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molybdenum electrodes20 may contribute markedly to 
overall hydrogen production. It only plays a role for 
temperatures above 2300 K, when the tungsten and 
molybdenum heater material may become exposed to 
steam atmosphere like in the quench phase of a QUENCH 
experiment. 
In case of bundle degradation, quantification of the 
facility related effects is very difficult because of the essen-
tially one-dimensional type of bundle experiments and the 
facility specific electrical heaters that stabilise decladded 
pellet stacks. 
An important finding can be derived from Table I: If 
reflood mass flow rates are sufficiently high, the fuel rod 
bundles including localized debris are quenched or cooled-
down successfully, if their final damage level does not 
exceed CDS 4. In such cases, the final configuration allows 
long-term coolability. In case of CDS 5, the experimental 
findings are not conclusive for commercial reactors, since 
in such conditions the spatial extension of the debris/pool 
becomes significant. In case of QUENCH-17, the tempera-
tures were too low to derive a reliable assessment. 
V. RELEVANT PARAMETERS
A number of important parameters that influence the 
course of an accident can be deduced from the available 
experimental database. They are listed in Table II together 
with the parameters they depend on and the parameters 
they influence. Their possible range and the range, covered 
by available experiments, indicate the field of open issues. 
The CDS prior to reflood can be assessed from PCT 
and experience from CORA tests. It reflects the scenario 
history, e.g. heat-up rate, steam availability, etc. and is 
therefore the most important parameter. As a first 
approach, the CDS was characterized by the PCT alone. 
According to the present knowledge, it seems promising 
also to take into account the core heat-up rate as well as 
steam availability at high temperature. Presently, the influ-
ence of steam starvation turns out to be the most dominant 
parameter for hydrogen production during reflood. How-
ever, such evaluations of the integral tests have to be clari-
fied by separate effects tests and code calculations. The 
respective data available from the QUENCH facility are 
included in Table I					 	
still open. 
VI. REFLOOD MAP
If we restrict the further analysis on two parameters 
only, namely RMFR and the CDS prior to reflood 
initiation, the results of the tests can be arranged in a 
reflood map (Table III), focused on the damage progress 
(left) and the relative amount of hydrogen production 
during reflood with respect to total hydrogen production 
(right). For this variable, also called H2 in the table, 
corrected values are used to exclude the non-prototypical 
reactions in the experiments. The range of the RMFR, 
together with a typical number of active emergency core 
cooling (ECC) systems, shown in the left column, refers to 
both parts of the figure. The experiments are located 
according to the CDS and indicated literally as mentioned 
in section II. The light green fields in the left part of Table 
III indicate reflood without serious damage propagation, 
while the yellow color indicates significant bundle damage. 
Light blue fields show that experimental evidence is 
unreliable because of lacking data. For such scenarios, 
simulations and experimental analyses are required, 
especially for the debris/molten pool region. The relative 
hydrogen production H2 is divided into three categories: i: 
below 20%, ii: above 20% but below 50% and iii: above 
50%. In some cases, a clear identification is doubtful, 
because of the experimental uncertainties. Therefore, inter-
mediate categories (i-ii, ii-iii) are included. Due to the 
difficult interpretation of the debris test QUENCH-17, 
labelled QD, – temperatures below 1800 °C, no tempera-
ture increase measured during reflooding, and no additio-
nal damage observed – the color coding has to be green. 
Accident sequence analyses with S/R5 and ASTEC 
cover the light blue region in Table III. They reveal that 
low mass flow rates can lead to unexpected adverse effects, 
if nearly all evaporated water is consumed by the Zircaloy 
in the core and nearly pure hydrogen is released into the 
containment. Such situations may occur, if an unsufficient 
number of ECC systems is activated by AMM or the 
performance of the activated ECC system is too low. From 
the results of QUENCH-11, the RMFR of 0.6 g/(s rod) is 
sufficient to cool a 1.2 m long rod bundle, but it is not 
sufficient to cool a fully dry core without formation of a 
large in-core pool. 
Table III demonstrates that the reflood initiated core 
damage progression and the additional hydrogen 
production show a similar behavior as can be expected, 
because all physical and chemical effects that contribute to 
damage progression need a high and increasing 
temperature for their continuation and enhancement. In 
addition, the table indicates a limit for successful core 
reflood. Including TMI-2 as an extreme case, the 
conclusion may be drawn that with increasing core damage 
increased reflood capability is necessary to maintain 
coolability. The unfavorable effect, however, is that 
hydrogen release increases with damage progression, and 
this affects the hydrogen countermeasures in the contain-
ment, if not sufficient steam is fed into the containment to 
avoid hydrogen deflagration or explosion. A high steam 
mass flow rate into the containment leads to a temporal 
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In the table, experiments are aligned by available reflood mass flow rate (vertical) and core damage state (horizontal) 
for damage progression (left) and additional hydrogen release during reflood (right). The status is of June 2014. 
Nevertheless, extrapolation can be performed using 
qualified codes until melting transfers particulate debris via 
cohesive debris into a molten pool. For that situation, only 
experiments performed for long term cooling of corium in 
a core catcher are available.  
A very important issue for AMM is the grace time for 
plant operators. When design basis conditions regime are 
exceeded, i.e. above 1200 °C, the time to reach transition 
from localized debris to molten pool can range between 20 
and 30 minutes depending on the scenario. This is not that 
much, but it may help to bring additional systems on-line 
so that a sufficient reflood mass flow rate can guarantee 
successful accident termination.  
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Flow rate (g/s*rod) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TMI-2: ~50 (BPT) T T T T T
Loft LP-FP2 L L L L L L 
very high (> 9.0) 
All HP-SI + LP-SI
high (2.0 - 9.0) P P P P
All LP-SI Q Q
medium (1.0 - 2.0) P Q Q P Q Q
All HP-SI Q C C Q C C
low ( 0.6... 1.0) Q PBF Q PBF
single HP-SI X Q X Q





Successfull termination C CORA i H2 < 20% i - ii
Termination with add. damage Q QUENCH ii 20 < H2 < 50% ii - iii
Extrapolation unproblematic QD QUENCH-Debris iii H2 > 50%
Extrapolation problematic X CODEX
Uncertain area P Parametr T TMI-2
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